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Resumo/Abstract: 
Despite some notable achievements in many parts of the planet the gap between the rich and the poor has 
become wider rather than tighter. On the political sphere success seems much more unequivocal, though. 
Indeed, beyond a handful of anachronistic exceptions, the world seems to have surrendered to the delights 
of democracy. From there to the conclusion that globalization favours democracy there was a small step 
that many political scientists all over the world have not hesitated to make. Refusing to share this optimism, 
many other scientists have, on the contrary, severely questioned the democratic character of the global 
economy, almost since the term globalization itself has been invented. In this work I will show how the logic 
of globalisation, in other words the logic of internationalised market capitalism conflicts with a substantive 
definition of democracy in developed countries as much as in developing countries. 
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Introduction 
 
 For quite some time now the global village metaphor has been served to the 
world’s public opinion, very fond of magical formulae, with the subliminal purpose of 
transmitting the idea that economic globalisation is the only model capable of 
reconciling economic efficiency and fraternity amongst all peoples. However, despite 
some notable achievements in many parts of the planet the gap between the rich and the 
poor has become wider rather than tighter (see Mazur, 2004; Honey, 2004). On the 
political sphere success seems much more unequivocal, though. Indeed, beyond a 
handful of anachronistic exceptions, the world seems to have surrendered to the delights 
of democracy. 
 
 From there to the conclusion that globalization favours democracy there was a 
small step that many political scientists all over the world have not hesitated to make. 
Refusing to share this optimism, many other scientists have, on the contrary, severely 
questioned the democratic character of the global economy, almost since the term 
globalization itself has been invented. Many studies have dealt with this question (see 
for example Obstfeld, 1998; Groupe de Lisbonne, 1995; Sapir, 2002; Przeworski and 
Meseguer, 2006, Hamilton, 2002; Fitoussi, 2004) reaching varied, and often 
contradictory, conclusions. Our concern here will be slightly different. We will not ask 
if globalization has brought more or less democracy to the world but if the logic 
pertaining to the global economy intrinsically favours the deepening of democracy and 
of human rights. The first step of this endeavour is to demystify the meaning of the 
concept of global economy. 
 
 
What is the Global Economy? 
 
Economic Globalisation cannot be assimilated with the sole growing 
internationalisation of national economies, consubstanciated in their deeper 
interdependence, in the increasing level of international trade and in the accelerating 
planetary circulation of productive factors. Firstly, and regarding the allegedly growing 
importance of international trade within the main national economies, we are facing an 
optical illusion that mistakes the verifiable increase of the absolute level of international 
trade with structural changes within these same economies. Indeed, despite having been 
continuously growing, the weight of foreign trade in Gross Domestic Products today is 
not significantly higher than that of 1914 for major economies (Rodrick, 1998; Feenstra, 
1998). 
 
 Regarding capital, the idea that the recent lifting of major barriers to its 
circulation catapulted the economies to a new era is also very common. Once again such 
a judgement succumbs to a scale effect resulting from a shallow appraisal of the past. 
The extraordinary amount of capitals wandering the world in a sort of peripatetic stroll 
is hiding a less scintillating reality, though. The net flows of capital, measured by the 
difference between domestic savings and domestic investments are, on the contrary, 
inferior to those met during the Gold Standard (Obstfeld, 1998: 11), and, therefore the 
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vibrating global financial market of the turn of the nineteenth century has still not found 
an equivalent one hundred years later. 
 
 Regarding labour or just people, are borders more permeable today than they 
were ever before? Tourism has shown a remarkable expansion and undoubtedly 
constitutes one of the most dynamic economic activities all over the world, but to 
extend this recent permeability of borders to the circulation of labour is above all an act 
of faith. The trivialisation of travel cannot hide the fact that labour mobility is not 
stronger today than it was in the beginning of the twentieth century. The borders of the 
most powerful economies seem, on the contrary, more inexpugnable than ever as the 
electronic and barbed wire wall separating the United States from Mexico or the 
Shengen Zone futuristic virtual fortress perfectly illustrate. 
 
 Indeed, the intense media coverage of the continuous scattering of illegal 
immigrants on our western shores is revealing enough of the difficulty rather than of the 
easiness of crossing the seas in search of a better life, especially when compared to the 
huge international migratory movements of the early twentieth century. 
 
 Despite these assertions, we cannot, however, conclude that history is repeating 
itself. The global economy of the beginning of the twentieth century embraced only a 
small part of the world economies, in other words market capitalism, because that is 
what this is all about, was dominant in just a bunch of countries. In the majority of the 
planet’s territories, when such a thing as an economy existed, this could be classified, at 
the most, as pre-capitalist.  
 
As market capitalism began to expand beyond its original nucleus, competing 
regulation systems made their appearance, firstly with the Russian revolution, then with 
Fascism and Nazism. With the end of the second world-war and later the end of colonial 
empires, capitalism confronted socialism in a struggle that lasted till the Berlin wall fell 
down. Contrasting with what had been its behaviour during the first stage of its 
expansion, capitalism reduced its degree of internationalisation during this period, 
localised itself, accepted ideological compromises with the state. What characterises the 
global economy of the turn of the millennium is, in my understanding, the expression of 
capitalism’s expansion to all corners of the globe with the exception of some bubbles of 
resistance that only rhetorically threatens its supremacy. 
 
 In its essence, then, the global economy consists in the definitive conquest of the 
planetary supremacy by the market capitalism model. There is nothing awkward in this 
assertion. Capitalism has always been historically averse to national reclusion. The fact 
that one of the main targets in the economic and political agenda of globalisation is 
removing barriers to the so-called adjustment by the market, perfectly illustrates the 
essence of this aversion (see Kozul-Wright, 1995: 159). Globalisation, therefore, is as 
old as capitalism itself, rather, is one of its constitutive features (Heilbroner, 1988; 
Collin, 1997; Held, 1997), a conclusion that wouldn’t surprise Lenin for whom a 
particular reading of globalisation, called imperialism, was supposed to be the supreme 
and final stage of capitalism (Lenine, 1977). 
 
 This conclusion is very important for our argument. Indeed, it is useless to look 
for the relationship between globalisation and democracy within the statistics 
concerning foreign trade or in any other part of the balance of payments sheet; one 
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should rather look for it but within the logic of market capitalism and of the institutions 
that have been guiding its propagation. As I have written elsewhere about the intrinsic 
contradiction between capitalism and democracy (Branco, 2000) I will not go through it 
again. 
 
 Instead I will focus on some of the aspects that are more commonly identified 
with global issues, that is to say the conflict between the territorialisation of democracy 
versus the deterritorialisation of the global economy; the undemocratic character of 
decisions within the Inter-Governmental Institutions such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank or the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Some particular 
aspects of the conflict between democracy and the global economy concerning 
developing countries will also be referred towards the end of my argument. 
 
 
The territorialisation of democracy versus the deterritorialisation of the global 
economy 
 
 One of the conditions demanded by a democratic regime is the right of the 
people to participate in the process of making a decision that will affect them (Dahl, 
2000). To cut a long story short, today, such participation is obtained mainly through 
free and competitive elections involving every citizen of age. The only true problem 
here is to decide who is a citizen and who is not. This is a very important question 
because a decision can only be democratically legitimate if it is sufficiently independent 
of influences and interactions originated outside the Demos (Collin, 1997; Dahl, 1997). 
The democratic system is, thereby, confined to the political geography of a given 
community. 
 
 That is why the development of the democratic idea followed the steps of the 
evolution of this political space. According to Michel Beaud both Greek’s democracy 
and the tax payer’s democracy of pre-capitalist State-Cities expressed themselves within 
a finite space. The physical boundaries of both these democracies matched those of the 
city and the interests at stake corresponded to those of very specific groups, citizens in 
the first case and merchant bourgeoisie in the second (Beaud, 1997: 233). Modern 
democracy, in turn, expanded its political space by matching its territory with the 
boundaries of the nation-state and adopting universal suffrage. 
 
 The path taken by the market economy is substantially different. The spatial 
confinement that the very notion of market suggests, in other words the place where 
trade happens, gave place in the global era, not to the expansion of its territory, but to its 
disentanglement, in other words to a “deterritorialisation” of the mechanisms of 
creation, production and distribution of goods and services, contrasting sharply with the 
“territorialisation” of democracy. 
 
 Thus, whereas a substantial part of major economic decisions is made within a 
“deterritorialised” frame, in other words within a virtual territory woven in network by 
the “world markets”, the mechanisms of democratic participation and its constitutive 
institutions are, on the contrary, confined to the growing narrowness of the Nation-
State. The result is an increasing physical separation between the centres of decision and 
the people affected by those same decisions (Cassen, 1997), weakening, therefore, the 
scope of democracy. 
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 It seems that the transformation of the economy is going on at a faster pace than 
the transformation of the polity, then. Is that a coincidence or is that part of a deeper 
movement? According to David Morris this increasing separation between governance 
and citizenship is part of a long process also characterised by the separation between the 
producer and the consumer or between the city dump and the dust bin (Morris, 1996: 
220), in other words is part of a process that can also be called economic development. 
Therefore, the separation between the decision and the community affected by that same 
decision is nothing more than the political expression of the growing partition of society 
resulting from specialization and social division of labour, the conflict between the 
global economy and democracy being, then, the normal outcome of the expansion of 
market capitalism. 
 
 Does this mean that only small communities closed to the outside world can 
really live in democracy? No! This means that one has to look for new ways of 
participating democratically in the decisions that are shaping the world today. How can 
we do this? I do not possess miraculous recipes, but one thing is for sure, for the time 
being one cannot expect the International Institutions, like the IMF, the World Bank or 
the WTO to play a decisive role in producing democratic global governance. 
 
 
International Institutions and Democracy 
 
 As mentioned above, economic globalisation results from the normal unfolding 
of capitalism’s logic, but one should not conclude that the global economy is the 
product of decentralized decisions only. In other words the global economy does not 
result from the unrestrained action of market mechanisms only. 
 
 Both national governments, by legislating in favour of the market or by lifting 
barriers to the circulation of goods and capital, and Intergovernmental Organisations 
actively contributed to produce and shape the global economy. In what governmental 
action is concerned, their decisions can be considered democratic as long as the 
governments themselves have been democratically elected, although we could engage 
into deeper debate. As far as Intergovernmental Organisations are concerned the matter 
is slightly more complex. 
 
 Indeed, the decisions produced by these organisations can hardly be considered 
democratic. The criteria upon which decisions are made differ substantially from those 
adopted by national governments. Whereas the majority of votes legitimates national 
governments to act on behalf of a country’s citizens, that is not the case within 
Intergovernmental Organisations. 
 
 Let us take the case of the IMF and the World Bank, for instance. It is not the 
number of votes, expressed by the number of voters that weighs the most but economic 
strength. In this particular case it’s a country’s contribution to the organisation’s budget 
that determines its power to influence decisions. Imagine that a country’s government 
was elected not by the system of each citizen one vote, but each euro one vote, in other 
words a system according to which the rich would have more power to decide than the 
poor. This would certainly be unacceptable. Well this is how it works in the IMF or the 
World Bank! This is all the more shocking as these organisations have been interfering 
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more and more deeply with matters for which national governments were exclusively 
responsible before. 
 
 Take the conditions countries have to meet in order to get IMF or World Bank 
loans, for example. In the 1980s countries that asked for loans had to meet 6 to 10 
performance criteria, whereas in the 1990s these same countries had to meet something 
like 26 criteria (Kapur, 2001). Well, about half of the voting power in the IMF and the 
World Bank is in the hands of seven countries; the United States, Japan, France, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Russia and Saudi Arabia. 
 
 This is only possible due to the particular method of assigning votes within these 
organisations. Each member country possesses 250 basic votes plus one additional vote 
for each 100.000 Special Drawing Rights they contribute to the organisation’s budget 
(Momani, 2004, 881). That is why the United States hold 17.11% of the votes whereas 
China only 2.94 % (Momani, 2004: 882). If the calculation method rested on the 
principle of one man one vote instead of one Special Drawing Right one vote, China 
would have to hold 4 times more votes than the United States, instead of holding 6 
times less. The new calculation method made some changes but this scandalous 
discrepancy was only slightly mitigated. 
 
 The heart of the matter is that within the Intergovernmental Organisations the 
majority of member states can only participate theoretically in the making of decisions 
that affect them, violating, therefore, a major principle of democracy. Twenty three 
African countries amongst the poorest in the world and the most affected by the 
conditionality criteria imposed by the IMF, for instance, hold only 1.16% of the votes 
(Momani, 2004: 882). 
 
 Some facts can be added to this non democratic process of decision making. In 
the course of the IMF’s history the undemocratic character of its decisions was even 
reinforced. While 135 more countries joined the IMF, the percentage of basic votes in 
the total amount of votes for the entire organisation decreased from 12.4% to 2.1% 
(UNDP, 2002), reinforcing, therefore, the power of the richer countries. 
 
 This concentration of power within the Intergovernmental Organisations 
represents the contemporary face of global hegemony, that is to say the United States 
hegemony in the world economy. According to Paul Knox and others, the British 
hegemony within the capitalist world economy was characterised by a mix strategy of 
formal and informal imperialism, in other words, by imperial-building and extensive 
investment outside the empire, whereas the United States avoided the burden of formal 
imperialism by sponsoring Intergovernmental Organisations, with the same results 
(Knox et al., 2003: 76-77). By not being able to influence decisions that affect them, 
many countries lost de facto a substantial part of their sovereignty. This external 
imposition happened discretely but by no means should one conclude that this process 
was not violent. 
 
 The loss of national sovereignty constitutes always a violent event. Edward 
Goldsmith in an article entitled “Development as Colonialism” tells us a very revealing 
story about Tunisia’s loss of sovereignty to France. In the end of the nineteenth century, 
the Bey of Tunis, in order to reimburse his debts towards French banks, was obliged to 
accept the creation of a French protectorate in Tunisia, a testimony of how national 
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independence can be traded against financial solvency, either following an imperialist or 
neo-imperialist strategy (Goldsmith, 1996). Indeed, the ways in which the IMF and the 
World Bank operate do not seem substantially different from the methods used by 
France’s colonial power to submit Tunisia. 
 
 Many scientists will tell you that if the IMF and the World Bank’s decisions are 
far from being democratic the World Trade Organisation, on the contrary, respects the 
basic principles of democracy. At the WTO the voting system rests on the principle of 
one nation one vote and the decisions are taken through consensus. Therefore, less 
powerful countries can allegedly influence decisions and especially veto those decisions 
that can harm their interests (Hamilton, 2002: 10). 
 
 However, reality is not as bright as it seems. Firstly it is not certain that the 
system of one nation one vote is much better than the system one euro one vote, as 
China will have the same power as Luxemburg which is several times less populated. 
On the other hand the more relevant decisions are not taken in general assemblies but in 
what has been called the “green room”, in other words in small committees called by the 
organisation’s Chairman and generally influenced by the United States, the European 
Union, Japan and Canada, and from which developing countries are generally excluded 
(UNDP, 2002: 118). 
 
 To this democratic deficit one should add the fact that the Intergovernmental 
Organisations are unaccountable before those affected by their decisions (Muchlinski, 
2003). Indeed, one doesn’t know yet to whom they respond. To national governments, 
to the people, to nobody?! If a government makes decisions that are contrary to the will 
of the people, the people can overthrow it in the following elections. If 
Intergovernmental Organisations make decisions that are contrary to the will of the 
people, the people can do little about it! 
 
 
Globalization and Democracy in Developing Countries 
 
 Let me now talk of something not completely different but yet parallel. It has 
been said that authoritarian government constitutes an obstacle to development. Well, 
globalisation can be an obstacle to democratisation in developing countries, as the 
examples of social and economic structure, colonial heritage and structural adjustment 
perfectly illustrate. 
 
 
Social and Economic Structure 
 
 From a slightly orthodox economic standing point, if rulers are so weakly 
inclined to democratise their countries, despite the fact that there is some sort of second 
rank consensus to take democracy as the best political system for economic 
development, it can only be because they are not interested in democratising, or in other 
words because democratisation goes against their best interests. An autocrat will 
rationally resist to democracy, then, if this means that in the process he will lose more 
than just political power (Robinson, 1998). 
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 This behaviour is consistent with a classical and institutionalist compromise 
theory that considers institutional change to preferably occur when agents detaining 
power perceive the advantages of pursuing their private interests according to different 
rules of the game (Grindle, 2001; Robinson, 1998). The crucial question becomes, then, 
why losing political power constitutes an attempt on rulers’ economic interests. Some 
answers can be found in the social and economic structure of many third world 
countries. 
 
 These countries’ economies, most especially in Africa, are frequently dependent 
on the export of a scarce variety of natural resources or plantation crops. This particular 
economic structure has shown a tendency to lead to loot-seeking activities (Collier and 
Gunning, 1999: 9). In other words through monopoly, excessive taxation and 
corruption, rulers have had a relatively easy opportunity to gripe a considerable share of 
their countries’ resources. This kind of appropriation of national income is clearly 
opposed to democratic, problem solving, distribution of national wealth, even more so 
when the ruling elites constitute a small group. 
 
 The gains to an extractive strategy, an euphemism for loot, are closely related to 
the size of the ruling elite group (Acemoglu et al, 2001: 1376). When the elite is scarce, 
each member can expect a larger piece of the pie and so, the smaller the elite group, and 
we could add the more unequal the income distribution, the greater the incentives to be 
extractive. Following the same line of thought, the greater the extractive character, the 
greater the risk for the elite’s members of becoming political losers, that is to say, of 
losing their economic and social status if replaced, which, in turn, favours authoritarian 
strategies to keep the power. 
 
 Furthermore, this kind of economic structure does not favour the uprising of new 
elites that, along the lines of agency theory, would engage in political struggle with the 
already installed elites and would end up forcing them to accept the democratic game 
(see Mazo, 2005). 
 
 It is not all too unexpected that this kind of economic structure incites rulers to 
keep the power. Indeed, with the notable exception of Botswana, most African countries 
that rely on natural resources are having more troubles either to democratise or to 
consolidate democracy than others. Angola (see Campos and Marques, 2005), Nigeria, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone or Equatorial Guinea are good 
examples of this phenomenon. What can be more unexpected is that, in these 
circumstances, the population may receive the same incentives, in other words to be 
hostile to democratic alternation. 
 
 Indeed, through free elections, people may be pushed to prefer keeping rulers in 
office despite clearly condemning their behaviour. In a street interview on the occasion 
of the first pluralist elections in Mozambique, when asked to comment the performance 
of the party in office, the Frelimo, a citizen declared they had spent their time robbing 
the people. Continuing with the interview, the journalist asked whom was he going to 
vote for. Much to the astonishment of the interviewer, he said that he was going to vote 
for the Frelimo. When the journalist confronted the citizen with the possible 
contradiction of his negative opinion about the Frelimo and his voting intentions, he 
simply answered that unlike its competitors, namely the Renamo, Frelimo had already 
done its share of robbing the people. 
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 Well this economic structure is the result of what has been called dependent 
development, meaning the particular place that was reserved to developing countries in 
the global economy, in other words international division of labour. There is a 
consensus on the fact that the logic of boundless capitalist development leads to the 
intensification of international trade and to specialization. In this sense globalization can 
constitute an obstacle to democracy in developing countries because it reinforces the 
formerly mentioned vicious dependency on natural resources in many countries, with a 
special reference one again to Africa. Indeed, not only this dependency has not been 
overcome, but other negative aspects, such as degradation of the terms of trade, were 
added to exacerbate this dependency. 
 
 The evolution of the terms of trade has not been historically favourable to 
developing countries and the situation seems to have worsened in the last decade. As far 
as agricultural exports are concerned, in sub-Saharan Africa for example, the terms of 
trade index, base 100 in 1990, shrank from 185 in 1960 to 85 in 2000 (UNCTAD, 
2005). This not only affects the availability of means that can influence democracy, but 
also pushes countries to insist on expanding those few sectors that are responsible for 
the production of foreign currency, in other words leads them into reinforcing 
specialization, and perpetuating an economic structure unfavourable to democracy. 
 
 
Colonial Heritage and Democracy 
 
 If one admits that social and economic structures are, in essence, historically 
determined, referring to the several hundreds of years of European colonial rule, under 
which the great majority of countries in the third world has lived, is unavoidable. In 
relation to the theme of democracy, colonial heritage can influence democratisation 
insofar as it has been determinant in shaping both the social and the economic structures 
and in trapping cultural diversity within the limits of arbitrarily designed territories. 
 
 In many third world countries, and especially in Africa, both the excessive 
specialisation and alienating dependence from volatile external markets, whose effects 
on democracy have just referred to above, are essentially an historic resilience of 
European colonisers, of the fact that they were mainly interested in exploiting natural 
resources and exotic crops (Frank, 1966; Jalée, 1973; Amin, 1973; Amin, 1977). 
 
 In turn, the fact that the colonial administration delegated the day to day running 
of the state to a small domestic elite (Acemoglu et al., 2001), as well as the low 
investment made on educating the native population, partly explains the existence, at 
the time of independence, of a small elite group, almost exclusively connected to either 
extractive activities or colonial administration. 
 
 After having taken control of the state, these elites received few incentives to 
change the institutions and consequently favoured the undemocratic and extractive 
institutions that prevailed in the colonial era (Acemoglu et al., 2001). A comparative 
study of Botswana and Lesotho provides an enlightening example on this subject. 
Despite sharing the same traditional ruling institutions in pre-colonial times and being 
culturally very close, Botswana evolved towards a democracy and Lesotho did not. The 
reason for this divergence could be sought in the recent history of the two countries. 
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 The limited impact of colonial rule in Botswana, as compared to the experiences 
of many other nations in Africa, South America or the Caribbean, allowed the 
continuity of pre-colonial institutions and the elites that came to power after the 
independence were only partly members of the former administrative elite (Acemoglu et 
al., 2002: 23), and the power, therefore, became essentially delegated. In Lesotho, on 
the contrary, the wars against the Boers and the fact that the British were much more 
intervenient undermined the traditional institutions and contributed to the centralisation 
of political power in the hands of the colonial elites (Acemoglu et al., 2002: 29). 
 
 Finally, the colonial heritage can also partly explain the recognised difficulties in 
democratising multicultural states. Indeed, the colonial administration is not only 
responsible for the imprisoned cultural diversity by designing administrative regions, 
upon which the new nations were to be built, regardless of its cultural profile, but also 
for the invention of ethnical diversity itself (see Branco, 2006). 
 
 The methodical slicing of native populations into tribes and ethnic groups was 
usually done with the purpose of controlling vast territories with just a handful of 
expatriated administrators, as the British did in Nigeria or the Belgians, more 
paradigmatically even, in Ruanda Urundi, which later gave birth to two independent 
countries, Rwanda and Burundi, through the well known artificial definition of pseudo 
anthropological and cultural differences between the Tutsis and the Hutus in order to 
justify the delegation of the colonial executive administration into the hands of the Tutsi 
minority (Lacoste, 1993: 747-748). 
 
 Well, there seems to be some generalized recognition that it is easier for a 
culturally homogenous country to democratise than for a country with deeply 
differentiated and conflictive subcultures (see Dahl, 2000; Bardhan, 1999; Leftwich, 
2000; Boutros-Ghali, 2003). Indeed, whenever there is strong ethnic diversity, political 
structures tend to be organized around ethnic groups rather than around interest groups. 
Therefore, whenever an election is called it appears to be ethnic belonging, or 
demographic vigour, that is being balloted, rather than strategies outlined to enhance the 
public good. 
 
 Furthermore, sympathizers of a particular culture frequently see their demands 
as questions of principle, as too crucial to indulge in compromise, and democratic 
resolution of political conflicts needs, precisely, negotiation, conciliation and 
compromise (Dahl, 2000). 
 
 
Structural Adjustment and the Debt Burden 
 
 The debt burden, and the consequent need to face their international financial 
commitments, pushes developing countries exactly in the direction already seen above, 
that is to say to perpetuate an economic structure unfavourable to democracy. The 
structural adjustment programs, for example, especially designed to ensure debt 
repayment, have forced these countries to adopt policies that affected the conditions of 
democratization and its consolidation. Firstly, many developing countries were obliged 
to overemphasize their commercial objectives at the expense of their social objectives. 
In consequence, not only the struggle against poverty and the effort to raise the level of 
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education were slowed down, but the economy got more dependent than before on the 
export of natural resources (see Mazur, 2004) as well. 
 
 Secondly it seems quite clear that structural adjustment policies are so rough on 
the people that very often its execution implied slowing down and even abruptly 
stopping democratic processes. About Chile, for example, W. Bello (1996) suggests 
that, on account of the sacrifices demanded to the population, only a dictatorship like 
the one established by Pinochet in September 11, 1973, could have managed to 
implement such a harsh structural adjustment program without igniting a social 
uprising. 
 
 In turn, M. Teubal, shows how, in a softer manner, governments led by former 
Argentinean president Menem, with the pretext of structural adjustment, passed more 
bills through the expedient of decrees of Necessidad y Urgência, in other words without 
parliamentary approval, more often than all the preceding governments added (Teubal, 
1996: 212). One should not be surprised, then, if when asked about what would be the 
more favourable political regime to structural adjustment, H. Biennen and J. Waterbury, 
politely answered one where votes do not count (Biennen and Waterbury, 1992:396). 
 
 At last, the fact that these programs have been presented to developing countries 
as the only alternative to conciliate financial orthodoxy and development did not leave, 
one must admit, much room for democratic debate. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This paper’s intention consisted in arguing that worries concerning the low 
content of democracy within globalisation, sometimes expressed even by some of their 
more enthusiastic heralds, are, indeed, funded, but mostly in showing that phenomena 
underlying these worries are much more complex than what is generally put forward in 
debate, namely in the media. Indeed, the undemocratic character of globalisation does 
not exhaust itself in a collection of anecdotes about global bureaucracy being unable to 
address issues raised by global citizenship. Not only one discovers that democratic 
erosion is a heavy tendency of the dominant economic model but also that counteracting 
it demands more than just procedural reforms. 
 
 The main threat impending on democracy does not concern individual freedom 
taken in the classical sense as the individual liberty limited only by another individual’s 
own liberty; it concerns the menace of destroying politics. I believe that democracy can 
only find its deep meaning when it incorporates a collective ideal, a progressive utopia, 
in other words a project for bettering each citizen’s life. This project supposes a 
dynamic of change, to which globalisation claims to subscribe as a matter of fact, but 
progress is not a synonym of change. Change is observed by looking into the past, and 
can be taken as a scientific fact unadorned by value judgements, in other words change 
can happen for better or for worse. Progress, on the contrary, must be built upon ethical 
values and projects itself in the future. Thus, in a democratic society one should be able 
to decide what values one cares the most for and then design an economic system that 
strengthen these values. 
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 One of the objections to this critique of globalisation could consist in saying that 
people’s powerlessness in imposing their choices is not new and that it is not forcibly 
the outcome of globalisation only. That is true, but what needs to be stressed at this 
stage is that globalisation does not contribute to change this situation; on the contrary, it 
contributes to make things even worse. Imagine yourself as a prisoner unfairly 
convicted to a life sentence. Imagine, then, that you are transferred from a normal 
prison, where there are some chances of escaping, to a maximum security prison, where 
the chances of escaping are close to none. This transfer is not responsible for the fact 
that you are unjustly imprisoned. Indeed, the new prison didn’t change a thing to the 
fact that you were condemned to spend your life in prison. Nevertheless, the fact that 
the escaping perspectives are null, from your particular point of view, constitutes a non 
negligible constraint added to your despair. 
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